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Jan Müller
Natural Goodness and the Political Form of Human Life
Abstract   Ethical Naturalism attempts to explain the objective normativity 
effective in human practices by reference to the relation between a living in-
dividual and the life-form it exhibits. This explanation falls short in the case 
of human beings (1) – not merely because of their essential rationality, but 
because the idea of normativity implicit in practice is dependent on the form 
of normativity’s being made explicit (2). I argue that this explicit form of 
normativity’s force and claim – the law in general – implies a tension between 
an explicit norm’s claim to absoluteness and the particularity of the situa-
tional case it is applied to. This tension may seem to produce an inherent 
violence corrupting the very idea of objective normativity inherent in the hu-
man form of life (3); in fact, it shows that the human form of life is essen-
tially political. That the human form of life is essentially political does not 
contradict the idea of objective normativity – provided that this objectivity is 
not derived from a conception of “natural goodness”, but rather from the 
actuality of human practice and its principle, justice (4).
Keywords: Natural Goodness, Ethical Naturalism, normativity, form of life, 
practices, politics, Agamben, Anscombe, Benjamin, Foot.
1.1. Human conduct – rational action and thought – exhibits a normative 
form: To think of an action is to represent it as an instance of a generic 
process-form. To identify something as an action is to understand it in 
light of generic action concepts, that is: in light of a description of how 
such things are typically done, situating it step by step in a wider context 
of interrelated generic action-forms. Thus, talk of action immediately 
represents them in a normative mode: Identifying an occurrence as an 
action involves taking a normative stance towards the agent and her 
activity. This special type of predication – not merely singling out a 
particular class of “events”, but shifting the mode of representing a sub-
ject matter in predicationͱ – is definitive for action, the corresponding 
higher-level practices and for praxis in general: The logical grammar of 
“action” implies that actions are represented as falling under an idea of 
1  Anscombe 1963: §19. Cf. Kertscher 2015: 102, Thompson 2011: 209. This difference 
not in subject but in mode suggests that “actions” (what the agent is doing) are not 
to be understood as simply a sub-class of events. What one is doing only appears as 
a mere event when it is represented as what was done (of what happened). Not only 
are actions sui generis; it stands to reason that with respect to action the category of 
“event” is not fundamental but derived by abstracting from the grammatical gap 
between human action and mere happenings that befall an agent from without.
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goodnessͲ; that is why Elizabeth Anscombe says that “[a]ll human action 
is moral action. It is either good or bad” (Anscombe 2005: 209). This 
“grammatical remark” elucidates the concept “action” by pointing to the 
form of predicative thought in which something like action can figure 
at all; and it has become a core argument in what might well be the most 
promising and exciting strand of contemporary metaethics – for it shows 
how human conduct is formally subject to a normativity which, rather 
than merely supplementing an otherwise “neutral” description of events, 
reveals the very nature of the issueͳ. At the same time, the remark ex-
plains the objectivity – that is: the actual und thus unquestionable force 
– of the norms governing action. They are implicitly actualized in the 
very act that exemplifies them; the formal goodness of a singular action 
hence lies in its relative accordance to its norm. Since every action is 
situated in the wider context of inferentially and practically related ge-
neric action-forms or practices, each action’s quality of “goodness” is 
derived from the most general form of praxis: the way we as humans 
generally act and think in concordance. It is the actuality of human 
praxis in general, then, that explains (by exemplification through each 
and every individual act) at once the quasi-natural source and the con-
tingency, the objective force and the natural unintelligibility of norma-
tivity.ʹ Let’s call this generic form of praxis the human life-form.͵
1.2. This formal (or “grammatical”) account however lacks explanation 
of what characterises the general form of praxis substantially – for know-
ing the formal make-up of a possible answer to the question “what is 
good action” does not give guidance in the miniscule of quotidian life. 
Metaethical naturalists like Philippa Foot attempt to show, however, that 
2  Cf. Geach 1956: 33f. Note that Geach does not claim that attributive uses of „good“ 
and „bad“ are enforced by their surface grammar; he merely notes a shift in function 
whenever they relate attributively to the concept „human“ in the sense of „agent“ and 
pertinent verb classes; cf. Vendler 1963: 246.
3  Anscombe stresses that there are of course “neutral” action description – but she 
points out that such “neutral” descriptions are derivative abstractions: descriptions 
of human actions in which it is permissible to disregard human action’s normative 
form because they do not report what an agent is doing, but rather the fact what has 
been done; cf. Anscombe 2005: 214. See also Anscombe’s analogous treatment of the 
idea of „brute facts“ (Anscombe 1981a).
4  Cf. Anscombe 1981b: 100, 103.
5  This is the way Wittgenstein talks of “forms of life”, for example in explaining what 
kind of non-negotiable “agreement” characterises mastery of (the rules of) language: 
“What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human 
beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” (Wittgen-
stein 2009: §241). This interpretation is outlined in Kertscher/Müller 2015: §3.
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the formal account is already substantive enough: understanding human 
action, they argue, equals (at least formally) understanding the activity 
of living individuals, or of life in generalͶ. Judgements about the activity 
of living organisms exhibit an irreducible normative form, in that they 
establish a relation between reference to an individual and reference to 
the individual’s species. Identifying an organism – a canary, say – implies 
representing it as belonging to a species which may be typically charac-
terised by generic, timeless judgements of the form “The S is/ does/ has 
F”: “The canary feeds in flocks”. Michael Thompson calls such judgements 
“natural-historical judgements”, and the sentences employed “Aristotelian 
categoricals”ͷ. Compiled in a system of natural-historical judgements, 
they articulate what it is for something überhaupt to be an S: the life-form 
of Ss. Since they do so generically, they imply a normative standard effec-
tive in singular judgements. Observing, for example, that “this canary is 
a solitary feeder” inferentially yields that “this canary is somehow pecu-
liar”, i.e. not conforming to the normative standard its species-description 
implies. And since feeding in flocks has a function for the typical canary’s 
well-being (an individual is less likely to fall prey to predators), the solitary 
canary is not only peculiar, but defective or bad: it lacks something the 
(generically characterised) canary requires for its well-being and flour-
ishing.͸ This idea of “natural goodness” – Foot argues – pertains to human 
beings as well as canaries: Describing the way humans live in general 
yields an idea of what it is for human beings to live according to their 
species-form; and since – drawing from Aristotle’s argument on the prop-
er function (ergon) of man – “the function of man is an activity of soul 
which follows or implies reason” (that is: which conforms, albeit in a 
higher or lesser degree, to a standard of reason), it follows that for humans 
being a good example of one’s species is realizing this capacity to its full-
est potential – “human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting 
6  Cf. Foot 2001: Ch. 3.
7  Cf. Thompson 2008: Ch. I,4.
8  Note how the generality of such characterisations does not allow for inductive 
correction and thus need not conform to statistical accuracy. A “natural-historical 
judgment [i.e., a judgment about the characteristics of a life-form] may be true though 
individuals falling under both the subject and predicate concepts are as rare as one 
likes, statistically speaking” (Thompson 2008: 68). Even if our solitary canary were to 
do just fine on his own, it would still aberrate from what canaries normally do; and 
even if it were to belong to a flock of misornithic canaries, or was the last canary on 
the face of the earth, it (and all its hypothetical f lock-mates) would still count as 
“defective” canaries. The logical grammar of such judgements precedes their empiri-
cal substantiation; this is why adequacy of species-descriptions in biological taxon-
omy cannot be ensured by means of observation alone, but necessarily involves mod-
els of evolution and speculative prognosis; cf. Hoffmann 2014: ch. 6.
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virtue” (Aristotle 2009 [Eth. nic.]: 1098a7-8, 16-17). The capacity to pur-
sue a rational life, then, characterises human beings in general; and this 
provides a standard of goodness for human activity which, on the one 
hand, relies on the generic description of what is necessary for the flour-
ishing of human beings͹, and on the other hand allows for the ethical 
evaluation of human action: For, since human action is an actualization 
of the capacity of reason, considerations about what is good for human 
flourishing in general provide reasons for (the evaluation of) individual 
action. Responsiveness to reasons or lack thereof in turn provides 
grounds for the evaluation of an individual’s virtuous character – of the 
way she exemplifies her species.
1.3. This account of “natural goodness” gives an explanation of the nor-
mativity of human practice in general, or of the human form of life, by 
reference to the kind of organism engaged in it. This kind of organism 
is determined per genus proximum et differentia specifica: First the gram-
mar of evaluating living beings in general, and then the specifics for 
evaluating a particular species (“rational animals”) are spelled out. This 
methodology underlies Peter Geach’s famous dictum that “[m]en need 
virtues as bees need stings” (Geach 1977: 17): For both men and beasts 
employment of some trait is necessary for individual well-being; they 
differ in the fact that in the case of humans an additional capacity for 
reason is involved. But such an “additive account” of human rationalityͱͰ 
and, subsequently, of the force and validity of human praxis’ normativ-
ity, runs into serious difficulties, for the capacity for reason not only in-
volves responsiveness to reasons but also the ability to weigh and evalu-
ate reasons, that is, to question the validity and adequacy of their claims 
– reason’s essential reflexivity. In fact, both are one faculty: the ability to 
understand reasons, to be open to their claim, is the ability to inces-
santly question their validity and ask for justification. The same reflexiv-
ity holds for practical thought – that is: thought which is active, thought 
in action or as action. It does not suffice to model the cause of an action 
after the Humean idea of an efficient cause (a desire) which is merely 
transmitted by thought; instead, practical thought is the causa formalis 
of human action.ͱͱ But then, acting for reasons cannot be judged against 
“natural norms” in the same way our canary’s behaviour is judged against 
  9  Cf. Foot 2001: 43.
10  Cf. Boyle, internet.
11  Cf. Thompson 2008: 95f., Rödl 2007: 42ff.
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the standards of its life-form. For the capacity for rational thought and 
action is a natural trait of human beings – yet its exercise conforms to its 
own norms, not those of the life-form whose distinguishing feature it is: 
“Reason does not just open our eyes to our nature, as members of the 
animal species we belong to; it also enables and even obliges us to step 
back from it, in a way that puts its bearing on our practical problems 
into question” (McDowell 1998, 173). One might well say that since it is 
natural that individuals of the species homo sapiens sapiens can acquire 
a capacity for reason, it would – in the Footian sense of the word – indeed 
be bad of an individual to “behave like an animal”, to act without rhyme 
or reason. If an agent would so behave, we would rightly judge her to 
behave inhumane – that is, in a way which seems to call into question her 
belonging to mankind altogether. But of course, this is mere semblance; 
our horror in the face of such acts shows that we do not regard such an 
individual as falling under a different species concept (wondering how 
we ever came to see her as a fellow human being), but recognize her as a 
member of our humane world who seriously lacks in character. We un-
derstand immediately that, of course, she acted for reasons – and are 
astonished by the twisted, distorted form her reasoning assumed.ͱͲ But 
the normative force backing up our astonishment does not spring from 
a violation of the natural standards of our common species. It springs 
from the way in which this natural standard is satisfied; for the evildoer 
does act from reasons; she has, as John McDowell puts it, “acquired a 
second nature with that [rational] shape, [her] eyes were opened to real 
reasons for acting” (McDowell 1998, 192).
1.4. The upshot of McDowell’s argument is that human beings do not 
simply fall under their life-form in the way canaries do; they are not sub-
ject to an objective normativity which, as it were, dictates their needs – at 
least not with regards to morals. Human beings fall under their life-form 
in the mode of bringing themselves under it.ͱͳ This shift in exhibiting one’s 
life-form by actively debating what counts as a good realization of our 
12  This is, I take it, the long and short of Hannah Arendt’s much disputed analysis of 
the “banality of evil”: That evil is, in fact, a shape of practical reasoning, and as such 
poses a formal problem for moral understanding that cannot be solved by merely casting 
the evildoer from the realm of rational agents; cf. Arendt 1963: Preface; Gaita 2004: 6, 313.
13  McDowell himself conceives of this difference in exhibiting one’s life-form 
rather dualistically: He understands man as an animal whose nature enables it to 
acquire a “second nature”, to become a member of human practices and navigate the 
“space of reasons”. Cf. Stahl 2014, Halbig 2006: §2.
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“species” neutralises the thrust of the ethical naturalist’s argument: for 
“that what members of one’s species need is not guaranteed to appeal to 
practical reason” (McDowell 1998, 192) – not only because practical rea-
son is understood as sui generis vis-à-vis the natural world and might 
well (judged from a “side-ways on”-perspective: falsely) neglect an indi-
vidual’s specific needs, but because it is not clear in advance what counts 
as a need, or what counts as flourishing. In bringing themselves under 
their life-form, human beings constantly evaluate, and so re-form and 
transform the boundaries and the substantive cornerstones of this, their 
life-formͱʹ. Note that nothing of what I said encourages the idea of hu-
man beings somehow “overcoming” their nature, conquering mortality, 
as a species renouncing nourishment or other such follies. That “human 
beings fall under their life-form in the manner of bringing themselves 
under it” is a grammatical remark: Because of the way in which human 
beings fall under the concept which expresses their life-form, the term 
“species” in reference to humans serves another functionͱ͵: It does not 
merely denote a set of general judgements about a form of life, but a 
mode of actively relating to this life-form description. Human beings, in 
a popular Marxian phrase, “make their own history”ͱͶ. This is the same 
grammatical remark; understanding the human form of life differs es-
sentially from understanding forms of life in general, for the human 
life-form – the general concept of what it is to lead a human life – is an 
object of the activity of the beings that exemplify this form. Hence, the 
“first historical act of these individuals [sc. human beings] by which 
they distinguish themselves from animals is not that they think but that 
they begin to produce their own means of living“ (Marx/Engels 1978: 20): 
Human history proper is separated from the mere natural history of 
14  “Hunger is hunger, but hunger that satisfies itself by cooked flesh eaten with 
forks and knives is a hunger different from that which devours raw f lesh” (Marx 
1983: 27).
15  This is not to deny that, of course, human beings are animals, more precisely: 
higher mammals, related to the great apes, etc. But these judgements make up the 
natural history of man as an animal, leaving aside his essential rationality (and in-
deed, that man possesses the capacity for certain forms of information processing 
might well figure in a biology course book; what exactly characterises the form of our 
thought, however, belongs to a different strata – a hermeneutics of man’s second 
nature). I leave aside attempts to rephrase ethical naturalism in this vain, i.e. as a 
hermeneutics of the human life-form. I believe that some of these attempts bear some 
resemblance to the account I outline here; cf. Hoffmann 2015: §9ff. On the whole, 
however, the idea that it belongs to man as a biological species to develop a herme-
neutic of its natural history falls prey to the objections I gave.
16  “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1960: 115).
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animals by a categorical gap. We might accentuate this (logical or gram-
matical) gap by eschewing the attribute “natural” in talk of the “natural 
history“ of humans. Here, its function hearkens back to uses of “natural” 
meaning a thing’s essence (of what it is for something to be what it is, 
to exhibit its own form), whereas its function in ethical naturalism is 
to locate living beings in the wider context of the “natural order” as it 
has been understood since the modern period.ͱͷ Thus, man’s essential 
history is different from the natural history of the species homo sapiens 
sapiens – not in that human beings were somehow “more” than mere 
animalsͱ͸, but in that human beings fall under their species concept or 
life-form in a radically different way. For human beings, their life-form 
essentially is an object of their activity. Normativity, customs, language 
and law – the institutions that constitute the central ideas of vital de-
scriptions of human life – are not naturally pre-given; they are the 
“means of life” human beings produce in leading their livesͱ͹. That does 
not contradict the fact that for each and every individual the normative 
institutions are ineluctable and objectively given. We find ourselves 
subject to the normative claims our form of life has on us – but, again, 
not in the way that animals are subjected to their life-form but in the 
way that human action, practical thought, essentially involves recogni-
tion of these claims and establishing an inquiring distance to them, 
recognition of their force and the desire to understand them as being 
founded on reasons.
2.1. If this double stance towards one’s own life-form is what character-
ises the way “natural goodness” in the sense of “essential goodness” plays 
an irreducible part in human action – falling under one’s life-form in the 
mode of leading a liveͲͰ –, then an account of man’s “natural history” 
17  Cf. Kambartel 1989: 75.
18  Cf. Boyle (internet). Such an “additive account” of human rationality typically gives 
rise to rationalist accounts underlining the sui generis nature of reason. On such ac-
counts, too, ethical naturalism is unsatisfying; however, the proposed remedy typically 
involves a dualist explanation of reason’s autonomy as logically independent from the 
lives lived by human beings, thus obscuring the grammatical gap in the function of the 
term “species” from the opposite direction; cf. Heinrichs 2015: §5 and Halbig 2015: §6.
19  Matthias Haase stresses this point in his critique of ethical naturalism; how-
ever, he interprets the term “means of life” as referring only to food and nourishment, 
and thus falls short of the substantial critique of naive materialism he intends. Cf. 
Haase 2015: 297.
20  This is, again, not so say that this transformation of their way of living is something 
that could be conceived of as brought about by intentional individual acts. “Trans-
forming one’s way of living” is not an action; it is the mode, the form of human action 
in general.
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cannot yield the force and hardness of logical necessity in the evaluation 
of action that ethical naturalism hopes for. For virtually every intelligible 
description of human praxis in general serves the function of exemplify-
ing this mode of falling under a life-form; even practices commonly con-
sidered evil or detrimental are valid instances of the form of human life, 
expressing how action is subject to the normativity of praxis in general. 
Note how this does not entail historicist relativism and subsequent scep-
ticism – as if the normativity in question only pertained to “praxis as we 
know it”, or “western civilization”, all of which may have been different 
in bygone times and change again in the future. It merely refutes the 
naturalist’s claim by commenting on the grammar of “human life-form” 
and emphasizing an essential tension between the thrust of the account 
of man’s “natural [sc. essential] history”, the normative force its institu-
tions yield on the one hand, and the fact that the rational questioning of 
precisely that thrust on the other hand belongs to this very history. One 
might say provocatively that for humans the question “what it is to count 
as human” is at the same time always already categorically answered and 
– in its substantive minutiae – essentially openͲͱ. That is why understand-
ing the form of human life, its essential rationality manifested first and 
foremost in action, does not immediately produce the kinds of natural 
necessities standing in for practical reasons in the naturalist’s accounts. 
If there is necessity it results from the historical form of human thought 
and sensibilityͲͲ; and this implies that it requires rational acknowledge-
ment by the very individuals whose activity it purports to govern. To say 
what is sound in the human being is, if it is meant to serve as an argu-
ment for the necessity of certain virtues, rather a statement about the 
history of human practice; if its purpose is to elucidate human form, it 
does so merely in virtue of the grammar it exemplifies, i.e. the fact that 
it is distinctive of the human form of life to involve reference to reasons 
for action, that in categorical descriptions of human activity there is, 
inevitably, normativity at workͲͳ. The idea of human form evolves around 
21  I take it that although there is a strong “family resemblance” between this idea 
and the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner, both accounts are still 
distinguished by a grave difference: On Plessner’s account the essential “openness” 
of human beings is to be understood not as a conceptual provocation but as a positive 
feature. In contrast, the account presented here takes this “openness” as a reminder 
of a conceptual tension – as a problem, not its sublation. The outcome, however, is 
similar: The question what constitutes a human way of life remains essentially a 
practical and political question. For a reading of Plessner along these lines cf. Schürmann 
2014: ch. 5.
22  Cf. Marx 1968: 542.
23  That is why Wittgenstein characterises his grammatical remarks as remarks on 
“the natural history of man”, only to add that “we can also invent fictitious natural 
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the idea of acting for reasons, and this idea implies a formal standard of 
goodnessͲʹ. Yet the question of wherein that goodness lies substantively 
cannot be answered by reference to a natural-historical species-descrip-
tion; it is rather “a labor of the entire history of the world down to the 
present” (Marx 1968: 542).
This might seem to threaten the idea of justified normativity – of Justice 
– altogether. Now, I take it that there is of course something like a formal 
idea of justice implied in thinking of something as a fellow human being, 
in recognizing someone as a person, and in thinking of oneself first-
personally immediately sublating the ostensive difference between think-
ing of oneself and thinking of anotherͲ͵. Since justice is not merely a 
virtue amongst others “but the whole of virtue”, that is: the mode in 
which virtue in general is completed by addressing anotherͲͶ – it follows 
that the very idea of communal praxis is a political idea. Yet this conviction 
is seriously endangered once the human life-form – and let’s remember 
it includes refering to, and explicating this very form – is understood as 
reflexive in the manner outlined. If a substantive account of the human 
form of life is to be formally understood as being a product of the mode 
of individual activity it categorically defines, of its history and self-evo-
lution, then potential conflict enters into the reassuring idea of “falling 
under one’s life-form by bringing oneself under it”.
2.2. Michael Thompson argues that the form of human life is known 
non-observationally: Engaging in rational activity, thinking the thought 
that “I think this thought”, is immediately knowing oneself for what one 
is doing – exemplifying self-conscious activity. Hence, “the concept human 
is a pure concept of the understanding devoid of even the least empirical 
accretion” (2004: 69); it is a formal concept that explicates a categorical 
manner of being. This manner of being is, methodologically, not just 
history for our purposes” (Wittgenstein 2009: §365). His point is that whatever intel-
ligible description of human life is given – fictitious or otherwise –, it necessarily 
exemplifies the form of a (possible) description of human life; it serves as a re-
minder of the inevitability of the form of thought which is epitomized in such a 
description’s intelligibility. 
24  Cf. Anscombe 2005: 214: “To say that ‘human action’ and ‘moral action (sc. of a 
human being)’ are equivalent is to say that all human action in concreto is either good 
or bad simpliciter. […] The term ‘moral’ adds no sense to the phrase, because we are 
talking about human actions, and the ‘moral goodness’ of an action is nothing but its 
goodness as a human action. I mean: the goodness with which it is a good action”.
25  Cf. Rödl 2007: Ch. 6; Thompson 2004: 380f.
26  Aristotle 2009 [Eth. nic.]: 1130a8-14; Benjamin 1995: 41.
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another token of the activity type “living”, but rather the starting point 
for an elucidation – by noting the relative differences to this mode of 
being active – of all forms of life. Human life is, says Thompson, “the first 
life form concept”Ͳͷ: It is the form of living in light of which other modes 
of being are, by virtue of their differences and shortcomings, distin-
guishedͲ͸. Practical-rational self-relation – the inherent normativity of 
practical reasoning which is definitive of the human form of activity – 
exemplifies the grammar of thoughts in which individuals are in gen-
eral represented as exhibiting their life-form. Its logical form is thus 
prior to the distinction of a plurality of different life-forms, and prior to 
abstractly subsuming such multiple forms (including the human form!) 
under the common header of a general “representation of life”. The core 
argument of ethical naturalism, as it were, is based on an inversion of 
this methodological order: The idea of “natural goodness” takes the most 
abstract common denominator of different usages of “living”, being-in-
activity which has its cause in itself, as a base for the idea of a life-form’s 
goodness. Action is then understood as a kind of activity, namely: activity 
caused by knowledge of itself, which is nonetheless mutatis mutandis 
subject to the normativity of “natural goodness” in general. Hence, in the 
naturalist account the fact that something belongs to its species is under-
stood as a reason-giver that trumps the reflexivity of reason. As John 
Hacker-Wright writes, we “cannot know ourselves as having a capacity for 
agency without having been motivated to act on some reason. It follows 
that nobody can be neutral toward such a capacity [...]. All agents must 
view the capacity as normal for human beings and avow this interpretation 
as their own. This makes the standard applied to each agent as a being for 
whom agency is normal necessarily more than a mere theoretical fact 
27  Analogously, practical knowledge as explained by Anscombe, might be called “the 
first concept of knowledge”: “[I]t is the agent‘s knowledge of what he is doing that gives 
the descriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intention. [...] [W]e 
can say that where (a) the description of an event is of a type to be formally the de-
scription of an executed intention (b) the event is actually the execution of an intention 
(by our criteria) then the account given by Aquinas of the nature of practical knowledge 
holds: Practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’, unlike ‘speculative’ 
knowledge, which ‘is derived from the objects known’” (Anscombe 1963: 87). 
28  This does not imply a substantive stance towards man’s place in something like a 
ranked order of life; it merely states that the human form of life we are non-observa-
tionally acquainted with (by virtue of exhibiting it) is the methodological starting point, 
in the same way that “[h]uman anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The 
intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species [...] can be 
understood only after the higher development is already known” (Marx 1983: 39). Only in 
relation to this ineluctable starting point is the meaning of talk of “sub-rational” beings, 
or oppositely the idea of a “divine intellect” (which is essentially an abstractive concept 
of human intellect barring some of its characteristics), meaningful.
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among others” (Hacker-Wright 2012: 21): it is a practical fact whose norma-
tive force cannot be avoided lest what is thought to be good for humans 
as a species is violated. But though we might have a pretty good notion of 
what that might include, we lack an ultimate justification for it as soon 
as we take the idea seriously that the mode of human’s falling under their 
life-form is bringing themselves under itͲ͹. This reveals a subtle difference 
in the grammar of the judgements that make up life-form descriptions of 
living beings in general and of human beings in particular: in the case of 
human beings the “Aristotelian categoricals”ͳͰ of life-form descriptions 
cannot be thought to unfold their normative force immediately and im-
plicitly, just in virtue of identifying something as falling under them. Since 
their claim must be debatable if they are to count as reasons for action – 
first and foremost: of our actions towards each other –, it is necessary that 
they be translatable into explicit claims, into rules, laws and command-
ments. If they are to figure in the rational practice of giving and taking 
reasons, they cannot retain their ostensive status as mere declarations of 
fact. Instead, they assume the enigmatic character of a “Categorical De-
clarative” (Cavell 1969: 29): Declarations whose factive intention is only 
intelligible via translation into explicit claims and demands, hence obfus-
cating the immediate necessity they purport to convey. To talk of a norm 
as implicitly governing the individuals falling under it necessitates to ad-
dress such norms in the peculiar mode of intentio obliqua: as explicit norms 
addressed with the reminder that, paradoxically, they ought to be under-
stood as implicit. To say that a norm is grounded in a form of life is, in-
evitably, to state this foundation as factive – yet to state it in a linguistic 
form that immediately calls this very claim into question. Consider, by 
way of analogy, Wittgenstein’s treatment of the unquestionable practical 
certainty that orients action, preceding, as it were, explicit considerations 
whether one in fact “knows” what one must have been certain of (because 
one has acted in a certain way)ͳͱ: here, too, the immediacy of certainty is 
difficult to even articulate. To address it as implicit, immediate “knowledge” 
risks either asserting an infallible knowledge, thus blatantly violating the 
concept of “knowledge”, or making up just a “very special kind” of know-
ledge, hence missing precisely the point the term “practical certainty” 
intended. Yet still we cannot refrain from addressing certainty in this 
systematically misleading way; for it is defined by its immediacy in 
29  Michael Thompson therefore talks of an essential “groundlessness“ of the human 
life-form and likens the status of its normativity to the Kantian notion of the Sit-
tengesetz’s reality being a “Faktum der Vernunft”; Thompson (internet): 7.
30  Cf. Foot 2001: 29.
31  Cf. Wittgenstein 1984: §510.
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actu which can only come into view ex post, at the price of having forgone 
its unquestionable orienting force. So it is with the “essential goodness” of 
the human life-form: The normative force our life-form exerts on us in 
virtue of our implicit practical compliance looses its hold through the fact 
that it needs to be made comprehensible and hence explicit.
2.3. When Elizabeth Anscombe programmatically outlined the idea of 
ethical naturalism in her seminal essay on “Modern moral philosophy”, 
she took issue with the “law conception of ethics”, arguing that it failed 
to account for the law’s objectivity: Since it must be modelled after an 
idea of divine law, its normative force as a motivational reason for action 
remains bound to the plight to obey it. But then the claim of the law 
remains relative to another law securing the applicability of the law in 
the first place; a variant of the rule-following problem ensuesͳͲ. Anscombe 
follows Wittgenstein in arguing that the appearance of a paradox in the 
idea of “following a rule” is produced by a mistaken notion of a rule’s 
status – that it is imagined along the lines of an explicit rule or lawͳͳ. 
Understanding, however, that rule-following is a “custom”, “a practice”, an 
“institution” (Wittgenstein 2009: §§199, 202), is understanding that one 
does not partake in such a practice in virtue of knowing the rules but 
through practical familiarisation and initiation into the custom. The 
analogon that likens ethical life to linguistic rule-following is the mode 
in which the normative force governing both ethical life and linguistic 
practice is known non-observationally: it is grounded in being a member 
of a linguistic community, or in being the kind of creature one is, respec-
tively.ͳʹ However, this very analogy reveals that the purported indubitability 
of reference to one’s practice as well as to one’s life-form does not hold: 
For although it shows that flat-out sceptical refusal of a normative claim 
towards our (ethical as well as linguistic) behaviour is indeed incompre-
hensible, the analogy also shows that exhibiting human form, just like 
membership in a practice, requires a reflective stance towards what the 
practice demands. This stance subverts the necessity of conformity that 
the idea of an implicit claim implies. Thus, normativity for humans re-
quires being made explicit so that its content can serve as reasons in 
action; being made explicit as norms, rules and claims, however, entails 
32  Cf. Anscombe 1981c: 30, 32.
33  Cf. Wittgenstein 2009: §201 and McDowell 2009: 104f., 109; cf. also Kertscher/
Müller 2014.
34  Cf. Anscombe 1981c: 44.
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need for justification – and thus in the case of humans, reference to “the 
kind of creature one is” alone cannot provide ultimate reasons for action, 
for it is itself in need of explication and justification.
With this shift in perspective the problem of the “law-conception” of 
ethics comes back with interest: for it is, despite its apparent insuffi-
ciency, not simply an erroneous conception to be done away with but 
rather a methodologically ineluctable transient point which requires 
adequate treatment. It necessarily comes up in deliberating the nature 
of normativity in human practices, because it reminds us of the way in 
which a normative claim’s actuality and validity needs to be related back 
to the self-constituting human practice from whence it stems. Hence the 
seeming threat to the idea of normative objectivity altogether: Consider 
how at the root of the conception of categorical life-form descriptions 
lies the assumption that the adequacy of such descriptions is in principle 
given in the way that beings fall under them; it is the life-form description 
which makes reference to an individual itself possible in the first place. 
I argued that this categorical relation between an individual and its ge-
neric form is – without loosing its categorical pertinence – essentially 
related back to the history and development of the human form of life, 
a product of the perpetual reproduction of the human form in general 
(the generic way in which human beings not merely live but lead a life). 
Thus its adequacy is based not on “empirical fact”, nor on metaphysical 
certainties, but on basic distinctions made in human practices. But now 
the normative force realized in the human way of life seems originate 
from the force with which these distinctions are upheld. The groundless-
ness of the human life-form suggests violence at its very root: a collapse 
of normative force’s mere facticity and its justificatory substantiation.
3.1. The problem of a naturalist account of the normativity effective in 
our human form of life, then, is that it does not take the grammar of 
normativity’s explicit articulation serious enough. In getting rid of the 
“law conception” of normativity altogether it also levels an essential 
feature of the life-form it is most urgently interested in: the reflexive 
articulation of human activity’s form. Yet it was precisely the grammar 
of this articulation that precipitated the problems ethical naturalism 
wanted to remedy: the problem of normativity’s origin, and the problem 
of its recursiveness, i.e. the paradox of rule-following. Let’s call the form 
in which norms, rules or conventions are explicated as posited demands, 
claims or commands the form of law in general (die “Rechtsform”); for 
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every explication of normativity takes its cues and words from the prac-
tice of explicit normative reasoning and normative judgement, that is: 
from the sphere of the law. The problem of objectivity at the core of 
ethical naturalism is now rephrased and explicated as the problem of the 
force of law’s origin.
In his 1921 essay on the “Critique of violence”ͳ͵ Walter Benjamin re-
phrases the very same conceptual problem by stating that the “task of a 
critique of violence can be summarized as that of expounding its relation 
to law and justice. For a cause, however effective, becomes an instance of 
violence, in the precise sense of the word, only when it bears on relations of 
ethical life [sittliche Verhältnisse]”, and the “the sphere of these relations 
[dieser Verhältnisse] is denoted by the concepts of law and justice” (Ben-
jamin 1986: 277; 1991: II 179)ͳͶ. In the absence of a satisfying ultimate 
justification of normative objectivity, the argument goes, every instance 
of a normative claim’s actuality in human practice can be seen as bearing 
down on human activity from without; in fact, being understandable as 
originating somehow “outside” or “beyond” human practice is the hall-
mark of such a claim’s objectivity, for it flat-out contradicts the idea of 
subjectively originating from individual arbitrariness or convention. Ben-
jamin introduces the term “violence” as an index of this connection. 
Understanding normative (ethical) objectivity is to understand violence 
as the force of normativity and its relation to justice; for this relation is 
what defines the human form of life – the form of human praxis in general. 
Benjamin’s question concerns the foundation of this relation: how to 
account for the force of “law” – of normativity in general – in a way that 
elucidates both the “violent” character of the law’s efficiency as originat-
ing “beyond”, and its justification by an idea of human justice. His ap-
proach sets out from the conceptual fact that normative practices by 
virtue of their inherent idea of justice’s claim to validity strive for univer-
salization, for “absoluteness”. They strive, as Benjamin puts it, for the 
transformation of “natural ends” (i.e. individual ends of intentional 
action) into “legal ends”, i.e. ends which are justified in virtue of occupy-
ing a place in the normative space of reason (Benjamin 1991: II 182). 
Therefore, “law” defines human practice; and precisely its boundlessness 
35  Benjamin uses the term „critique“ in its Kantian sense: as an analytical account 
of the merits and limits of conceptions of violence in ethical life. This has lead to 
considerable explanatory labour in readings which, misleadingly, tried to interpret 
Benjamin’s argument as merely a rejection of violence; cf. e.g. Honneth 2007: 121.
36  I quote Benjamin’s essay in a modified version of Edmund Jephcott’s translation; 
the second abbreviation refers to the volume and page in the Suhrkamp edition of 
Benjamin’s Collected Writings (Benjamin 1991). 
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makes its inherent violence so menacing. Both the tradition of natural 
law and legal positivism, Benjamin argues, fail to account for this danger, 
for they conceive of explicit norms as a “means” to the “end” of “justice”ͳͷ. 
Conceptions of natural law simply posit certain substantive ends as “nat-
urally justified”, hence failing to account for “the indeterminacy of 
means” (Benjamin 1986: 279; 1991: II 181): the fact that just ends do not 
automatically entail just means. Conversely, legal positivism refrains 
from formulating substantive ends at all, thereby reducing the objective 
claim (“the absoluteness of” justice as an “end”) to mere accordance with 
legal procedure (ibid.)ͳ͸. Within an explanatory framework organized 
after this model of means and ends alone, Benjamin reasons, law’s violence 
cannot be understood as “just”. A gap remains between normativity’s 
claim for justice and its bearing on ethical life “from without”.
3.2. One might suspect that ethical naturalism’s attempt to bridge that 
gap fails because it, too, follows the means-end-model: To give a func-
tional explanation of justice as necessary for social well-being seems to 
take normativity as a means to the just end of human flourishing.ͳ͹ Of 
course, the naturalist claim exceeds simple functionalism, for the func-
tion that “goodness” serves should not be understood as prescribed from 
without. The “goodness” in question is understood as a vital function of 
human organisms, hence the gap I outlined seems already to be bridged 
by counting responsiveness for reasons as part of this vital function.ʹͰ 
But the gap between normativity’s essential claim to justice and its ob-
jectivity results not from lack of connection between normativity and the 
human agent’s mode of being. It results from the logical, or grammatical 
form of its conceptual representation in thought: A concept of implicit 
normative force grounded in membership in the species – a concept that, 
on the other hand, can only be made intelligible in an explication that 
denies the very necessity it aimed to express. For the law in general is 
confronted with a problem of applicability, namely in two directions of 
37  This is their “common basic dogma: just ends can be attained by justified means, 
justified means used for just ends” (Benjamin 1986: 278).
38  This double critique of dominant foundations of “law” bears some resemblance 
to Carl Schmitt’s contemporary argument; indeed, the nature of Benjamin’s relation 
to Schmitt has been the subject of much debate (cf. e.g. Agamben 2005: 53ff., Honneth 
2007: 117ff., Heil 1996). I argue that these apparent similarities are simply due to a 
common point of departure – how to account for normativity’s objectivity; they do 
not affect the fundamental difference in their conceptions.
39  Cf. e.g. Anscombe 1981d: 155.
40  Cf. Lott 2015: 83.
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fit of a norm towards its subject: first, regarding which individuals are 
subject to the norm – who is rightly addressed by its claim, what counts 
as a case falling under the norm; and second, regarding the authority and 
justification with which these distinctions are made. Carl Schmitt inter-
prets this problem of applicability as the essential formal feature of nor-
mativity made explicit: Every normative judgement, he argues, implies a 
decision, because “the juristic deduction is not traceable in the last detail 
to its premises and because the circumstance that requires a decision 
remains an independently determining moment” (Schmitt 2005: 30). 
A norm does not govern its own application, if not for the price of a regress 
of norms; thus, normative judgement is by its very nature ultimately 
groundless. This groundlessness is “rooted in the character of the norma-
tive and is derived from the necessity of judging a concrete fact con-
cretely even though what is given as a standard for the judgment is only 
a legal principle in its general universality” (Schmitt 2005: 31). If this is 
correct, then there is indeed a violent tension inherent in the very form 
of explicit normative judgement: If the validity of normative judgement 
does not result from its formal structure, and if this indeterminacy results 
from the tension between the norm’s generality and the case individual’s 
concreteness, then every act of normative judgement arbitrarily bridges 
this gap in two directions: It posits an individual situation as a case of the 
norm, falling under it and being subject to its claim; at the same time, it 
redefines what counts as the norm’s normality, the general make-up of 
possible cases of the norm – for “[e]very general norm demands a normal, 
everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is 
subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium” 
(Schmitt 2005: 13). The question whether such normality is given or not, 
can – or so Schmitt argues – not be answered in advance, but is rather 
answered in and by judgement; every judgement intervenes in the practice 
of judgement mediating the general form and its particular instances in a 
continuous activity of “a living formation” (Schmitt 2005: 27), in which 
scope and direction of a norm’s force is perpetually modified, transformed 
and evolvedʹͱ. One might say that the question of normativity’s normality 
41  Cf. Schmitt 2005: 31. Benjamin develops the same idea by saying that normative 
violence can be described in two perspectives, or two modes: as “lawmaking” and as 
“law-preserving” violence (Benjamin 1986: 284). Both modes are, of course, mere 
flip-sides of each other: if law in general is made (or violently posited), then it is 
posited proclaiming its absoluteness – it is posited as if it had, in virtue of its generality, 
always already been in force. Hence, the lawmaking quality of violence immediately 
appears as law-preserving. Conversely, law-preserving violence, be it the act of 
judgement or the execution of a sanction, always bridges the gap between the norm’s 
generality and the particular situation (this is what defines its violence!). In judging 
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is precisely the conceptual revenant of the human being’s essential “open-
ness”: it signifies a precarious tension, an occasion for dispute within the 
realm of normativity. The objectivity of the law is nothing but the actual-
ity of this practice of judgement: This is Schmitt’s answer to the problem 
of objective normative forceʹͲ once a simple theological foundation of the 
“law conception” of normativity is no longer viable.ʹͳ And it is precisely 
this tension in which the violence of the law consists.
3.3. It might seem that this tension undermines the very idea of an essen-
tial normativity at work in judgements relating human individuals to their 
life-form. The formal argument regarding the form of thought, the very 
representation of a living being as active and as being the cause of its own 
activity remains untouched by this. But not so the account of what counts 
as a successful realisation of the species concept or life-form, the sub-
stantive standards of goodness, for its plausibility rests upon the very 
practice of judgement it purposes to elucidate. Although this practice of 
judgement is rational, it is precisely its rationality that reveals the char-
acteristic tension in explicit normative judgement. But then the practice 
of judging human conduct in light of the human life-form itself is faced 
something to be a case of the norm, the norm itself experiences a substantial modi-
fication. It gains a determinateness it can, in virtue of its generality, not provide for 
itself. Hence, the seemingly simple act of preserving a norm via its execution imme-
diately appears as lawmaking violence – for the enforced norm is no longer identical 
to the norm prior to its situational application.
42  It is, of course, only half of Schmitt’s answer; the other half results from Schmitt’s 
considering only the performative acts of judging persons to possibly facilitate closure 
of the gap that characterises the very form of normative judgement. This is the core 
argument of his decisionism: He believes that, ultimately, the idea of normative force 
rests on the idea of a judging subject whose entitlement to judge cannot be rationally 
accounted for but only be factively declared (cf. Schmitt 2005: 34ff.), and which stems 
from the subject’s sheer ability to enforce its decision. From this stems the authoritari-
anism Schmitt endorses. His argument hence articulates in the clearest possible terms 
the essential relativity of normative judgement (to the situation judged and the situation 
of the judgement) as a problem – only to embrace it as its own solution, personified in 
“the instance of competence” (a rough translation of “authority” personified). That “a 
decision” might be described as “absolute and independent of the correctness of its 
content” is, for Schmitt, not a scandal to be dealt with but rather an acclaimed feature 
of the sovereign judge (ibid.: 31). Hence, Schmitt explains the grammar of sovereignty 
in the sense of absolute normative validity and force only derivatively from explaining 
what characterises the sovereign subject: “he who decides on the exception” (ibid.: 5), 
which is mere shorthand for: he who is competent to judge whether something falls 
under a general norm or not, and by implication: what in general constitutes the norm’s 
“normality”, tokens falling without doubt within the scope of its claim. 
43  Schmitt sees theological justification as outdated in the same way Anscombe 
does; however he argues that the theological form is by no means obsolete but rath-
er the (only) adequate expression of the idea of law’s objectivity; cf. Schmitt 2005: 36.
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with an irreducible question regarding the life-form concept’s applicability: 
While it is true that the idea of the human form makes reference to an 
individual as exhibiting this form categorically possible in the first place 
and, as it were, puts into place the normative grammatical framework for 
representation of human life in thought, this very operation renders invis-
ible that the basic distinction at this framework’s root – viz., what counts 
as exhibiting the form in question – does not rest upon natural fact. The 
distinction between “rational” and “mere animals”, between “human life” 
and “mere life” does not hold – as it claims – in virtue of individuals ex-
emplifying different life-forms; rather the judgement that individuals 
exemplify different species concepts is based upon the distinction of 
modes of living being made within the human form, within human prac-
tice. The human form of life is distinguished from other forms of life in-
sofar human activity distinguishes itself from these other forms, or dis-
tinguishes itself in itself.ʹʹ Giorgio Agamben argues that this corrupts the 
very idea of sovereignty, that is: the idea of normativity in general’s force 
understood as justified. To understand that the form of human life con-
forms to an essential normativity, he reasons, is to conceal the distinction 
that ensures this normative form’s “normality”, its unquestionable ap-
plicabilityʹ͵. In distinguishing qualified human life (bios) from sub-ra-
tional animal life (zoé) it becomes necessary to account for the logical 
tension between the general life-form concept and the particular indi-
viduals falling under it, that is: to account for the ever-present question 
whether an individual does in fact exhibit its life-form. Since this question 
can neither be answered by exclusive reference to the general life-form 
concept (for this concept regains its determinateness only by virtue of the 
individuals exemplifying it) nor by exclusive reference to the individuals 
(for in identifying an individual for what it is the general life-form concept 
is always already present), this in practice ever-open question implies (as 
its centre of gravity, one might say) a zone of indifference, an essential 
indeterminateness Agamben calls “bare life”, visible only in problematic 
cases at the fringes of the rational practice of distinguishing “mere repro-
ductive life” from (normatively) “qualified life”ʹͶ. – One need not adopt 
the whole of Agamben’s suspicion that the very idea of normative force 
should be subject to a radical critique, and even less his conclusion that 
thus the very idea of the human life-form as a framework of normative 
judgement is fatally flawed by the violence it exerts already in its initial 
44  This is the meaning of Marx’s idea that “conscious life activity distinguishes man 
immediately from animal life activity” (Marx 1968: 516).
45  Cf. Agamben 1998: 26.
46  Cf. Agamben 1998: 181.
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distinction, the very definition of its subject area.ʹͷ But it is worthwhile 
to register his central intuition, dramatic as he may phrase it: That the 
human form of life – the rational practice of bringing oneself under a 
general “species-description” by means of explicit normative judgement 
– is at its very root political, that is: defined by a possibility of conflicting 
claims to an objective normativity. Such conflict cannot be resolved by 
theoretical argument or by reference to a common “natural goodness”, 
because it is the very hallmark of the human form: that which defines 
the grammar of the attribute “humane”, not as a sortal term in distin-
guishing different life-forms, but as a reflective concept that indicates a 
mode of living. To say that the human form of life is political is to say that 
the way in which human individuals bring themselves under their live 
form (immediately in action, or mediated in explicit forms of thought 
and judgement relating a human individual to the form of its activity) 
implies reference to the form and shape in which the practice of norma-
tive judgement is actualized: institutions, states, communities, positive 
47  In fact, Agamben’s broader project does his initial observation a disservice in 
taking a genealogical approach to an essentially logical (or grammatical) problem. 
Agamben argues that it is due to the tradition of European metaphysics and its 
fundamental distinctions – above all: the Aristotelian distinction between bios and 
zoé – that the concept of sovereignty as an explanation of normativity and normative 
force rests upon a perpetual political conservation of biopolitical classifications and 
the appropriate regimes of power (cf. Agamben 1998: 81). But not only is his reading 
of the Aristotelian distinction’s function far from compelling (cf. Boyle (internet): 
§1.3); above all, he mistakes the grammatical tension in the form of law as a mere 
product of an initial decisive distinction (taking Schmitt’s decisionist argument at 
face value), a distinction which only ever could become visible after biopolitic’s cul-
mination in the German extermination camps (cf. Agamben 1998, Ch. III.7). This 
leads him to postulate the need for a way of living beyond the normative form (i.e. 
“law” in general) under which life falls, a mode of existence beyond the idea of nor-
mative force. He calls this mode of existence “form-of-life” to underline the insepa-
rability, even the grammatical indistinguishability of an activity (“living”) and its 
form: “By the term form-of-life […] I mean a life that can never be separated from its 
form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life” 
(Agamben 2000: 3). I believe that this conclusion not only undercuts his initial find-
ing that the very grammar of “form of life” is characterised by an essential tension, 
but moreover leads to dubious ideas regarding emancipative political strategy. These 
come up most clearly in his interpretation of Franciscan monastic life as an attempt 
at “the possibility of a human existence beyond the law. [...] Franciscanism can be 
defined [...] as the attempt to realize a human life and practice absolutely outside the 
determinations of the law” (Agamben 2013: 110); if we “call this life that is unattain-
able by law ‘form of life’, then we can say that the syntagma forma vitae expresses the 
most proper intention of Franciscanism” (ibid.: 111). This intention however is obscure 
by its very definition. In abandoning the law, normativity in general’s explicit positive 
form, Agamben at the same time foregoes the possibility to account for the normative 
structure of his proposed radically different “form-of-life”. A mode of living whose 
form cannot even analytically be “separated” from the activity whose form it is becomes 
utterly unintelligible. 
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law, et cetera. Of course, meta-ethical objectivists would not objectʹ͸; but 
the idea outlined here furthermore entails that this essential politics of the 
human life-form is inherently problematic. The actuality of the objective 
normativity governing and structuring our form of life faces a conceptual 
challenge precisely because its situational adequacy cannot be ascertained 
but only, as it were, rehearsed and tested in human life and its self-de-
velopment. The human form of life is defined by this conceptual as well as 
practical tensionʹ͹. The formal argument of ethical naturalism holds: hu-
man form is (as its practical actualization and reproduction) the cause of 
what it (as explication by thought) understands. Yet what it understands is 
the inevitability of violence, of a gap between the generic species-form and 
the individuals bringing themselves under it; and this gap is ever-open 
because it belongs to the generic species-form that humans do not relate 
to it individually but in practical dispute and contest with their fellow hu-
mans͵Ͱ. Reason does provide us with the bare idea of satisfying one’s life-
form; but which modes of ethical life and practice may substantially count 
as such a satisfaction is essentially subject to political struggle.͵ͱ
48  Though it may be noted that explicit proposals to develop ethical naturalism in 
the direction of political theory are remarkably sparse; typically, an image of politics 
modelled after the late 20th century deliberative democracies of the western world 
serves as a backdrop for elucidating human “natural goodness” – as if this form of 
social organisation was self-evident; cf. for example Foot 2001: ch. 6.
49  “This is why the thesis stated at the logico-formal level [...] according to which the 
originary juridico political relation is the ban, not only is a thesis concerning the formal 
structure of sovereignty but also has a substantial character” (Agamben 1998: 109).
50  Cf. Hampshire 1989: 189. An example of this idea going unnoticed is Robert 
Brandom’s explanation of “constraint by norms”. He writes: “Being constrained by or 
subject to norms is a matter of belonging to a community, and that is a matter of being 
taken to be a member by the rest of the community” (Brandom 1979: 192). This last 
condition however – being accepted and recognized as a member – is far from un-
problematic. It raises the question of successful participation which is not only an-
swered by giving reasons – case in point: sharing a common species – but, essen-
tially, by eking out the right to claim membership. Hence, the very grammar of com-
munal normativity implies political struggle. That Brandom seems unaffected by this 
may be a result of the fact that, despite his best intentions, he takes an individualist 
stance towards the problem of participation.
51  Note that the issue at hand is not a supposed inadequacy of our conceptual 
framework but the very working of this irreducible conceptual form. The idea that 
individuals could somehow in principle “fall through the cracks” of our conceptual 
framework betrays nothing if not a solid misconception of the role and the status of 
the form of life in human thought. To refer to something as a living individual is rep-
resenting it in light of the form of life it exhibits; and likewise: to refer to someone as 
a person is to represent her in light of our shared form of life. The problem of misrep-
resentations of individuals whose rights to participation in the communal body were 
violated (of which a doleful abundance can be found throughout the history of man-
kind) is not a philosophical riddle inviting sceptic suspicions about the supposedly 
all-too narrow scope of our categorical framework. Such misrepresentations readily iden-
tify themselves as a political and moral scandal; for it is obvious that these individuals 
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4.1. Arguing that due to the grammar of its own articulation and expres-
sion political struggle defines the very idea of the human form of life seems 
to put the concept of objective normativity in dire straits. If normativity’s 
actuality is nothing but the actuality of the human practice of normative 
judgement – if the latter’s existence is the medium in which the former’s 
actuality is even conceivable in the first place –, then we seem to be 
obliged to advocate an at least historical-relativistic idea of normative 
objectivity, if not a subjectivist stance: Normativity is ever in development, 
thus its claims on our conduct can at best be relative to a current practice; 
at worst, it cannot even at present exert a valid force on us, for “we” could 
always – be it as an individual or a collective subject – choose to transform 
its substantive shape by our own authoritative judgement.͵Ͳ Hence, if the 
scope and the meaning of the human life-form concept – the concept of 
humans’ bringing themselves under the form they exhibit in action – is 
constantly contested and renegotiated, there appears to be a “tragic limit” 
to the level of objectivity achievable in normative judgement͵ͳ. But this 
“tragic limit” would at once also limit the intelligibility of the very concept 
of normative objectivity; it would be rendered senseless.
When Walter Benjamin argued that to understand ethical life is to un-
derstand the violence inherent in the idea of a conception of law, or of 
have been identified as exhibiting our common form of life, have been already acknowl-
edged as persons. They figure as such in our thought; it would be utterly pointless to 
even mention the fact that they allegedly do not belong, were this not so. Consider 
how representing mere things as living, or sub-rational creatures as rational, does come 
easy to us, and surely accounts for some of the grammatical misunderstandings we are 
continually confronted with (from meteors “aiming for earth”, to cats “plotting against 
blackbirds” or “telling us to hurry up with that tin of cat food”, up to evolution “sup-
plying finches with special beaks”): just like we are able to, in cases of all too open- 
minded inclusion, frame such manners of speaking as similes or analogies (“If a lion 
could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it”; Wittgenstein 2009: II §327), we would 
have to go through considerable lengths to provide justification for subsequent exclu-
sion of individuals we have already identified in light of our life-form. And indeed: 
authors throughout history regularly show that they very well feel the claims their own 
thought has put to them; why else would they comply to the necessity of providing 
elaborate reasons for – amongst others – the inability of people of colour to partake in 
enlightened reason, or the inability of women to exercise their right to political and 
social participation. The very description of the matter shows it to be an injustice, a 
wrong; it shows that those who verbosely claim it to express a self-evident right surely 
know it to articulate a wrong, for they have pronounced and expressed it so.
52  Obviously, the former position is a tragic rendering of Agamben’s account, while 
the latter draws from Schmitt’s presumably inevitable auctoritas interpositio (cf. Schmitt 
2005: 31). 
53  This is the conclusion Robert Cover draws: “as long as legal interpretation is 
constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long as people are committed 
to using or resisting the social organizations of violence in making their interpreta-
tions real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can be 
achieved” (Cover 1992: 238).
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normativity made explicit, he struggled with precisely this apparent di-
lemma: To understand explicit normativity as objective is to understand 
normative force as a means in light of the end it realises; yet this very con-
ceptualisation renders normative force indistinguishable from violence, a 
forceful intervention in our ethical life from without.͵ʹ To adhere to the 
idea of objective normativity, then, requires us to understand means as 
“pure”, that is: independently from the ends they may serve. To understand 
means as “pure” does not mean understanding them as non-violent͵͵; it 
implies, as Benjamin writes, that “the violence of an action can be judged 
no more from its effects than from its ends, but only from the law of its 
means” (Benjamin 1986: 292; 1991: II 195). To understand an action’s vio-
lence – its pertinence to the relations of ethical life, that is: as norma-
tively qualified –, it is necessary to account for its possible justice. Since 
addressing the “relation between violence and justice” cannot be achieved 
in the conceptual framework of means and ends – for it logically precedes 
this framework and makes it possible, identifying “justice” with “function-
ality towards an end” – Benjamin proposes to understand an action’s vio-
lence not “as a means to a preconceived end [....] but a manifestation” 
(ibid.: 294). This, he argues, is the grammar that initial models of norma-
tive objectivity exhibit: They imagine the absoluteness and objectivity of a 
normative claim as derived from a mythical figure, as a “a mere manifestation 
54  Properly speaking the term “ethical life” itself would be misused in such a grim 
context, for it would only denote the mere facticity of convention or an authority 
assumed by brute force.
55  Benjamin discusses such “non-violent means”, for example the “technique of civil 
agreement” (Benjamin 1986: 289). But such means are not “pure” in virtue of their being 
non-violent (as Axel Honneth thinks, thus interpreting communication as the prototype 
for the general form of “pure means”; cf. Honneth 2007: 145). Rather, their non-violence 
is accidental to their “purity”; it stems only from the fact that their field of employment 
is the non-normative elimination of technical problems: “They [...] never apply directly 
to the resolution of conflict between man and man, but only to matters concerning 
objects. In the most objectified [sachlichsten] relation of human conflicts to goods the 
sphere of nonviolent means opens up” (Benjamin 1986: 289; 1991: II 191f.). Such conflicts 
are oriented towards some objectified good; they appear as an interruption of quotidian 
practice. Hence a solution of such conflicts is neither achieved in a rational exchange of 
reasons, nor in establishing a balance of rights and duties, but merely by making the 
conflict – i.e. the interruption – disappear. There is no violence in Benjamin’s sense at 
play in such conflict resolution because the whole process is beyond ethical life; it mere-
ly concerns “the relationships of private persons” (ibid.). Benjamin narrates his account 
as if this sphere of “private conflict resolution” were in fact a historical predecessor to 
the rule of law (cf. ibid.); but this historical figure serves only to highlight a conceptual 
point: It is possible to understand the metaphysics of language as the “medium of being” 
without reducing it to the normativity of human practices – language in general is, as it 
were, only conceivable in the shape of human language, yet not reducible to it. The 
“Critique of Violence” thus follows the argument outlined in his tract “On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Man”; cf. Müller 2012: §3.
587
  INSTITUTIONELLE ASPEKTE DER BIOPOLITIK
of the gods. Not a means to their ends, scarcely a manifestation of their 
will, but first of all a manifestation of their existence” (ibid.: 294). It is this 
mythical understanding of objective normativity’s origin that constitutes 
the archetype of the “law conception” of normativity that Anscombe 
criticises (and Schmitt enthusiastically welcomes) – an understanding of 
law’s objectivity that ultimately rests upon a “justification” of normativity 
through sheer factual power.͵Ͷ Because the attempts to justify normative 
force by means of theories of natural law or of legal positivism fall short, 
Benjamin concludes, “the mythical manifestation of immediate violence 
shows itself fundamentally identical with all legal violence” (ibid.: 296): 
the latter has traditionally been modelled after the former.
4.2. If there was no other way to account for the law’s objectivity, Agamben 
would, alas, be right in assuming that the very idea of human activity’s 
accordance with a generic form implies not only “violence” in Benjamin’s 
use of the term, denoting an essential normative tension. We would be 
forced to acknowledge that, due to the form of its explication, the idea of 
human normativity is based on a primordial, unjustifiable distinction 
between “mere life” and the forcibly posited normality of the human life-
form – a distinction whose reinforcement would be the prime purpose of 
normative institutions in general, for “with mere life the rule of law over 
the living ceases. Mythical violence is bloody power over mere life for its 
own sake” (Benjamin 1986: 297). But this is the crucial point: The very 
category of “mere life” belongs to the mythical understanding of norma-
tivity – an understanding which cannot be circumvented when addressing 
normativity as absolute and objective, yet which is by no means exhaustive. 
The alternative to a mythical interpretation of normative objectivity Ben-
jamin presents is to understand it as divine – that is, to understand nor-
mativity’s claim to absolute validity without the detour of a personified 
deity figuring as its origin, but rather as identical with an idea of justice 
which transcends all concrete human practices, yet is intimately con-
cerned with them because it is their principle. “[D]ivine violence”, Ben-
jamin writes, is “pure power over all life for the sake of the living” (ibid.: 
297). The seemingly theological language-game Benjamin employs in fact 
serves to elucidate objective normativity as immanent in human practice. 
It serves as a reminder that the uncertainty in practices of normative 
judgement can only be identified against the backdrop of an idea of human 
56  Cf. Benjamin 1986: 295.
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life going right, of human form being exhibited successfully – that is, of 
an objective norm’s violent (i.e. effective in normative practice) force 
manifesting a force unavailable to human intervention and exemplifying 
the very principle of human practices as human, the characteristic prop-
erty of the human form of life. In a short fragment detailing the concept 
of justice, Benjamin argues that accounts of virtue ethics ultimately fall 
short in attempting to understand this double-faced objectivity – for since 
the explanation of virtue as a natural property of human beings succumbs, 
ultimately, to the criticism directed at natural law theory, virtue’s goodness 
can only be spelled out as a demand addressed at an individual: that it 
ought to strive to realize its own species-form in the best possible way. 
But the idea of “justice” does not express such a mere orienting idea; it 
has a factive sense. It expresses the idea of a humane world’s actuality. 
“Justice”, Benjamin writes, “does not seem to [primarily] refer to a subject’s 
good will but to a state of the world in general, justice is an ethical concept 
relating to the actual, virtue an ethical concept relating to the required. 
Virtue can be demanded, justice can ultimately only be, as a state of the 
world” (Benjamin 1995: 41). “Justice” attributively denotes the essential 
mode of human practice, its perpetual development and reproduction. 
This idea remains – in the first instance – necessarily abstract, for it mere-
ly articulates the form in which human practice is understood as governed 
by an objective normative force; a force which, despite its objectivity, is 
nonetheless a “manifestation” of nothing but this very practice’s actual-
ity, the medium in which something like a human form of “leading a life” 
can be thought of in the first place.͵ͷ The meaning of “justice” can therefore 
not be derived from the general “natural goodness” of perfectly realising 
one’s species-form, but contrariwise: the very idea of “natural” (i.e. es-
sential) goodness is derived from the idea of an actual just human world͵͸. 
“Natural goodness” is, then, not a fixed standard fit to resolve ethical ques-
57  Hence the “proposition that existence stands higher than a just existence is false 
and ignominious, if existence is to mean nothing other than mere life […]. It contains a 
mighty truth, however, if existence, or, better, life (words whose ambiguity is readily 
dispelled, analogously to that of freedom, when they are referred to two distinct spheres), 
means the irreducible, total condition that is ‘man’; if the proposition is intended to 
mean that the nonexistence of man is something more terrible than the (admittedly 
subordinate) not-yet-attained condition of the just man” (Benjamin 1986: 299).
58  Benjamin tries to capture this, albeit in his rather opaque style, writing that there 
“is a subject’s quite abstract principal right to every good, a right not grounded in 
needs but in justice, and whose ultimate intention is possibly not a subject’s right of 
ownership but a good’s right to goodness” (Benjamin 1995: 41): that a good’s quality 
of goodness pertains to human beings is to be understood as essential for human 
beings, but as accidental to the very idea of a good, lest its claim to absoluteness and 
objectivity is infringed.
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tions in theory. It expresses a formal clause in sorting, evaluating and navi-
gating the conflicting positions, the power relations and struggles that 
constitute the make-up of political life: Even if from the perspective of 
the participants an ultimate agreement on the adequacy and justice of 
our stances and actions is, in light of the manifold of social claims and 
requirements, unobtainable͵͹, this essential practical complexity cannot 
give rise to neither scepticism towards the very possibility of normative 
objectivity, nor to the sort of voluntarist subjectivism that figures as skep-
ticism’s gritty existentialist flipside. For the very idea of conflicting view-
points, of unresolvable clashes of interest, that is: of politics in general, 
is only intelligible in light of an idea of successful human practice, its 
development and perpetual transformation. Politics is, as one might say, 
the form of human movement, the form of humane activity. Rationality 
is its organ; justice is its telos. Thus, instead of looking at human nature 
as a guarantor of the source of ethical life’s normativity, we should seek 
to understand the political form of its practice: its indeterminacy in the 
essential situational uncertainty of actionͶͰ – keeping at bay the temptation 
to either fall for the “mythical” appearance of normativity’s reach, or to 
soothe the practical tension which defines our form of lifeͶͱ, and defines 
it as the original form of lifeͶͲ.
59  The standard case for such considerations is revolutionary action. A revolution 
can, by its very definition, not be intended, it cannot figure as an end justifying 
means (lest it be straightforward “mythical”, “bloody” violence); on the other hand, 
an emancipative political strategy would be ill-advised to forego the concept of 
revolutionary change altogether. Thus, the very concept of revolution denotes not 
an event but rather an issue of contestation: an analytical means to evaluate po-
litical practice, maybe even a descriptive viewpoint especially suited to interpret 
the relative failures of political action, pressing the question how a political practice 
had not been revolutionary. “[I]f the existence of violence outside the law, as pure 
immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes the proof that revolutionary violence, 
the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and by what 
means”. It is no oversight that Benjamin does not specify certain means – he is talk-
ing about political practice in general. Since political action is subject to normative 
contest, it is shown that it can, in principle, be objectively justified; that it can be 
a manifestation of, in Benjamin’s words, “divine violence” (and not merely be justi-
fied relatively to contingent factual norms, i.e. not justified). Yet precisely because 
political action can only by addressed in a framework of means and ends its ultimate 
justice remains a problem. “Less possible and also less urgent for humankind […] is 
to decide when unalloyed violence has been realized in particular cases. For only 
mythical violence, not divine, will be recognizable as such with certainty, unless it 
be in incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of violence is not visible to 
men” (Benjamin 1986: 300).
60  Cf. Hampshire 1999: 61; Derrida 1991: 57f.
61  Cf. Hampshire 1999: 80.
62  Philip Hogh and Felix Trautmann commented on a draft version of this essay, 
and I benefitted from their concise queries; Simon Müller helped considerably with 
what is not my first language. I thank them all.
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Jan Miler
Prirodna dobrota i politička forma ljudskog života
Rezime
Etič ki na tu ra li zam ob ja šnja va objek tiv nost u ljud skoj prak si de lo tvor ne nor-
ma tiv no sti lo gič kim od no si ma iz me đu ži ve in di vi due i for me ži vo ta ko ju 
eg zem pli fi ku je. Me đu tim, ovo ob ja šnje nje je u sluč aju ljud skog bić a ne do-
volj no (1) ne sa mo zbog nje go ve esen ci jal ne ra ci o nal no sti, ne go sto ga što je 
pred sta va prak tič no im pli cit ne nor ma tiv no sti upuć ena na eks pli ka ci ju (2). 
Iz no sim ar gu ment u ko rist te ze da eks pli ka ci ja nor ma tiv ne sna ge i nor ma tiv ne 
pre ten zi je – pra vo uop šte – uključ uje na pe tost iz me đu bez u slov ne pre ten zi je 
eks pli cit ne nor me i par ti ku lar no sti si tu a tiv nog sluč aja, na ko ji se pri me nju je. 
Ova ten zi ja bi se mo gla raz u me ti kao in di ci ja na si lja ko je ti me ru ši ide ju objek-
tiv ne nor ma tiv no sti uop šte, i ko je spa da u ljud sku for mu ži vo ta (3). Uisti nu, 
ono je sa mo na zna ka okol no sti da je ljud ska for ma ži vo ta su štin ski po li tič ka. 
A ta kav stav sto ga ne pro ti vreč i ide ji objek tiv ne nor ma tiv no sti – pret po sta vi-
mo li da se pod ra zu me va da ova objek tiv nost ni je iz ve de na iz ne kog mo de la 
„pri rod ne do bro te“, ne go pro iz i la zi iz stvar no sti ljud ske prak se i nje nog 
nač ela: prav de.
Ključ ne re či: pri rod na do bro ta, etič ki na tu ra li zam, for ma ži vo ta, prak sa, 
po li ti ka, Agam ben, Be nja min, Fut
